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David J. Gottlieb·
Editor's Note: Professor Gottlieb prepared this essayfor a panel discussion held at
the University ofKansas School ofLaw on September 9, 2005.
Four years ago, when a number of us spoke at the first of these forums, we
were aware that we were at a critical moment. For whatever it is worth, the
participants in that first forum did not take the position that the United States should
shrink from self-defense or from military action. We supported it. We also knew the
government would seek changes in domestic surveillance laws, and we welcomed what
we hoped would be an intelligent discussion of the issues.
Four years ago, while most of us thought existing legal frameworks, developed
over centuries by the civilized world and shaped by exposure to violence and terrorism,
had a lot to offer, we also recognized that the existing rules might need revision. We
believed, however, that these changes should and would occur the way legal changes
typically occur: for domestic law, through Congress; and for international law, via
consultation with our allies, in regional forums, or at the United Nations.
Four years later, we know this has not been the case. Instead, the
Admihistration took and continues to take the position that the threat of Islamic
terrorism presents the United States with an entirely new phenomenon. This view
argues that modem international terrorism is more than crime, so that existing criminal
laws are essentially irrelevant to bringing it under control. At the same time, although
we refer to this as a war on terror, we take the position that, as a legal matter, this also
really is not war. In particular, the limitations on treatment of combatants, honed
through generations of effort, have been determined to be inapplicable. The
administration has declared that it is not bound by either the Geneva Conventions or
conventions against torture. This position has been taken without specific
authorization by Congress and against the advice of the State Department and the
career military.
While there is something to be said for the proposition that our current situation
presents us with a new challenge, there is almost nothing to be said in support of the
conclusion that the administration drew from this insight - that the restraints imposed
by criminal procedure, international humanitarian law, and international human rights
law were inapplicable. The administration believes that it has no legal obligations that
attend to its treatment of detainees and that those detainees have no legal rights. Our
current position that we can ignore existing legal rules whenever we wish has resulted
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in the creation of what I will refer to as law-free zones. I would like to discuss two of
the means used by the administration to attempt to implement this strategy.
I. JURISDICTIONAL LAW-FREE ZONES
One of the principal means by which the government has attempted to create
law-free areas is by jurisdictional fiat: that is, by moving people away from courts and
law so as to be able to avoid review to test whether the government's beliefs about
their lack of rights were correct. There are at least three ways the government sought
to avoid having to account for the individuals placed in their custody.
Most notably, the government opened, several years ago, the now-infamous
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The facility was chosen, at least in part,
in the hope that it would put the individuals held there outside the reach of United
States law, or indeed, of any law. l Although the United States exercised complete
control over the base, and although it obviously would not allow the individuals
incarcerated therein to appeal to Cuban law, the government asserted that the
individuals could also not file a petition for habeas corpus in any United States court.
Indeed, in argument before the Ninth Circuit, the Administration asserted that United
States courts would not have jurisdiction to hear the claim of the individuals even if
they were being summarily executed or tortured?
Our government told us, by the way, that the detainees in Guantanamo were
the "worst of the worst." That is almost certainly untrue. In fact, most of them have
been released. Many of them, having subsequently been repatriated to Western
countries, are now free, as no one was ever able to demonstrate how they were
connected to terrorist activities. Many still there will almost certainly be released as
well.
For the real "worst of the worst," or at least those the government believes to
be the worst, there have been fates worse than Guantanamo. One means has been to
transfer detainees to countries in the Middle East known to practice torture routinely.
United States suspects have been sent to countries such as Syria, Uzbekistan and
Pakistan.3 In one case, a Syrian-born Canadian doctor, in transit through John F.
Kennedy Airport, was secretly taken by the United States, flown to Jordan, and turned
over to Syria, despite his pleas that he would be tortured if he were returned. He was
returned, he was tortured, and, now that he is back in Canada, our ~overnment is
refusing to cooperate in a Canadian inquiry about what happened to him.
Perhaps the most serious defiance of civilized norms has been our use of
disappearances. In our war in Iraq, the practice of holding what were called "ghost
detainees"- prisoners whose identities were not disclosed to the Red Cross or their
families- was widely utilized and, at least in one case, specifically approved by
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.5 In Congressional testimony, an Army General told the
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Senate Anned Services Committee that the number of secret prisoners was in the
dozens, up to as many as 100.6
Even longer tenn disappearances are apparently still going on as a part of CIA
operations in the global war on terror. The real "worst of the worst," such as Khalid
Sheik Mohammed, are being held at secret locations, with no access to the Red Cross,
no notification of families, no oversight with respect to their treatment, and, indeed, no
confinnation that they are actually being held. The Red Cross has repeatedly but
unsuccessfully sought infonnation on a number of these individuals.? According to a
New York Times report, President Bush infonned the CIA that he did not want to
know where these individuals were being held.8 The United States has refused to
make available to a Gennan court an alleged leader of AI-Qaeda, resulting in the
failure of the German Government to convict the only individuals charged so far for
complicity in the September 11 massacre. The United States has also refused, for the
worst of the worst, to allow officials of the Indonesian government to question the
suspects. Indonesia was eventually allowed to give the United States questions to ask
the individuals.9 There are accounts that the individuals held in custody under these
conditions have been tortured, although it is impossible to know anything about how
they are being treated, good or bad.
Disappearances are a violation of international law. They are a practice that
was perfected by the most repressive Latin American regimes during the second half of
the twentieth century. It was their way to terrorize opposition as well as avoid any
accountability for torture and murder that might be committed by those engaged in the
disappearances. It is unfortunate that, four years after September 11, we continue to be
a major human rights violator, but our practice here has not been fully repudiated or,
outside of Iraq, even investigated.
II. SUBSTANTIVE No-LAW ZONES
In addition to the jurisdictional no-law zones, the administration has argued
that, substantively, the individuals taken into United States custody are entitled to no
legal protection. The administration, over opposition of the State Department, our
career military, not to mention the rest of the democratic world, has taken the position
that terrorist suspects are not subject to the protections provided by the common
articles of the Geneva Conventions that relate to the treatment of prisoners of war, nor
are they subject to the protections for civilians that are a part of the Geneva
Conventions. In addition, the Administration believes that it is not bound, outside of
the United States, by the restraints that exist against cruel and inhumane treatment that
are a part of the Convention Against Torture, a treaty which we have signed. 1O The
Administration's position, still, is that suspects should not be entitled to the protections
of criminal procedure or of legal conventions relating to treatment of individuals
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captured in wartime. Thus, while asserting that it no longer engages in "torture," the
Administration continues to assert the position that it may engage in humiliation,
sensory deprivation, exposure to heat and cold, and other means prohibited to the rest
of the world in its struggle against terrorist suspects. The Administration's view that
our soldiers should have these rights is so adamant that President Bush has threatened
to veto Iraq appropriations for the next year if they contain a rider proposed by
Senators McCain and Graham that would ~rohibit the United States from engaging in
cruel and inhumane treatment of detainees. 1
The devastating effects of this policy are apparent to any American who wishes
to learn of them. Over and over again, our soldiers who engaged in interrogation have
been encouraged to behave in a brutal fashion. The similarity of some of the accounts,
their repeated nature, and the fact that they have occurred in each and every theatre of
the war on terror belies the government's claims that these brutal actions are
attributable to a few "bad apples." The most recent example, revealed in a recent
report by Human Rights Watch, described torture of prisoners taking place, on almost
a daily basis between September 2003 and April 2004, by members of the 82nd
Airborne Division in Iraq.12 The officer who revealed the abuse described a futile
seventeen-month effort on his part to "determine what specific standards governed the
treatment of detainees." He concluded that his inability to learn what now constitutes
legal interrogation practice contributed to abuses including "death threats, beatings,
broken bones, murder, exposure to elements, extreme forced physical exertion,
hostage-taking, stripping, sleep deprivation and degrading treatment.,,13
In addition to treating d~tainees as if they had no rights, the government asserts
the right to try the individuals for membership in AI-Qaeda, in military commissions
set up by the government. I have no doubt that AI-Qaeda officials who planned or
financed attacks against Americans are guilty of criminal offenses and should be tried
under United States law or International Criminal Conventions on the subject. Nor
should there be any impediment for war crimes trials against those who have
committed atrocities against civilians. But neither of these courses has been chosen by
the Administration. Instead, we are using what are essentially our own war crimes
tribunals to try individuals for offenses not against American criminal law, but of the
law of war. But there is at least a potential problem here, for it is not entirely clear that
in modem understanding of the term war crime, mere membership in a banned
organization or shooting at American troops ought to qualify. Moreover, if individuals
are going to be tried for offenses in the law of war, for example, for failure to follow
the Geneva Conventions, it would make sense that our government would be required
to conduct its proceedings with some attention to the limitations on Government power
that are also a part of the Geneva Convention.14
Our military commission system is a good example, in my mind, of our
inability to learn from our allies, or even from ourselves. Many of our allies, such as
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the United Kingdom, have had wrenching experiences and long experience in working
through the question of how to try terrorist suspects. Closer to home, we have a
military justice system that, while far from perfect, has long experience in balancing
security and individual rights. Our military commission system is more restrictive of
suspects' liberties than either of these examples, or of numerous other examples to be
found in democratic systems threatened with terrorism. The Commission system
posits trials on the President's say-so of individuals in a system with no right to
confrontation, no right to be present, and no right to consult with counsel about at least
some evidence. This is a system that the military lawyers assigned to represent the
defense believe to be rigged and with all of that, it has been woefully inefficient.
Finally, there is the question of detention. The administration has taken the
position that it may hold those it designates as enemy combatants as long as our
current war continues. In other words, it takes the position that while members and
supporters of terrorist groups don't have any of the rights of soldiers, they nevertheless
can be held for the duration of our conflict with AI-Qaeda, or perhaps with terrorism
itself, based merely upon the administration's untested assertion that these individuals
are members of AI-Qaeda. 15
Thus, in the four years after the September 11 attacks, our government has
asserted that it may seize those it believes to be its enemies, take them anywhere, treat
them pretty much as it wishes, try them, or hold them. Four years later, even though
we know our government has made these assertions, and even though we know of the
abuse that has resulted from these claims of impunity, we and our elected
representatives have made little effort to try to control those who act in our name.
III. CONCLUSION
Well, I suppose at this point, it is fair to ask, "So what? Who cares about these
people? As long as this policy has kept us safe, hasn't it been worth it?" So let me
explain what I believe to be some ofthe costs ofUnited States policy.
First, it has prevented us for achieving justice. One of the outcomes of
September 11 that I just would not have imagined is that, four years after the event, we
would have not tried anyone for the planning or financing of the worst crime ever
committed against Americans. I do not know whether our failure is because after four
years we do not know who planned and financed the event; whether we do know but
have never brought into custody those who have planned and financed the event;
whether we have the individuals in custody but are unwilling to try them because we
are afraid of the information that the trial would have to reveal; or whether we have the
individuals in custody but cannot try them because the information was obtained
through means, such as torture, which would prohibit its admission in court. Whatever
the reason, I believe this is a real disservice to our country.
11
Gottlieb
Second, our insistence that we be able to act with impunity has complicated our
efforts to mobilize international resources. It should be obvious to everyone by now
that international terrorism is an international problem, that the United States is not the
only place targeted, and that solutions to this problem must occur through international
cooperation. We need a common set of norms with our allies on the issue of prisoner
treatment and interrogation, so that individuals we capture who have offended the law
of other countries can be convicted in those countries. We need to be able to assure
countries who tum over prisoners to us that they will be humanely treated. We need to
work, much more vigorously than we have, for international conventions to deal with
terrorism.
Third, this has been a terrible disservice to our military. Career military
personnel were aware that civilized restraints that coexist with warfare must be taught
and reinforced. They warned that abandonment of the restraints embodied in charters
such as the Geneva Conventions would prove dangerous. We have placed our soldiers
in peril and, at least in some situations, encouraged them to behave like brutes.
Finally, we ought to at least understand how badly we have damaged our ability
to promote democracy and the rule of law. Three of the four of us on this panel spent a
good deal of time in the 1990's working in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Central and
Eastern Asia on projects to promote the rule of law. Some of our colleagues at other
institutions were critical advisors in the early 1990's to countries in Central and Eastern
Europe when they were writing their national constitutions. Our country had some
failures here, but there were also some amazing successes. Our policies over the last
several years have inflicted real damage on our ability to be taken seriously when we
attempt to encourage others to support democracy and human rights. If we really
believe that exporting democracy will lead to a safer world, we had better be willing to
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